The European gas system after 2022: why the next energy shock looks different

Every major energy crisis leaves a mark, not only on infrastructure or policy, but on the assumptions that underpin how systems are organised and governed. The European gas system after 2022 is not simply a remodeled version of what came before, but a system that reflects a different configuration shaped by the experience of vulnerability. 

How the European Gas System Changed After 2022 

Yet today’s European gas system and its uncertainties are structurally different from the one that entered the winter of 2022. 

Four years ago, Europe was still heavily dependent on Russian pipeline gas. In 2021, Russian gas accounted for roughly 45% of EU gas imports[1], and the system’s structure reflected decades of relatively stable trade relations built around long-term contracts and fixed pipeline corridors.

The 2022 gas supply shock unveiled how deeply these arrangements had shaped infrastructure configuration, market expectations and procurement strategies. At the dawn of the conflict, Russian pipeline imports began to decline sharply, leading to an expansion of LNG imports and the introduction of new governance mechanisms to reinforce storage levels and supply security. These changes did not eliminate Europe’s exposure to risks, but they changed how those risks manifest themselves.

Before the crisis, pipeline imports from Russia represented the backbone of European gas supply. Infrastructure, contracts and trade dynamics had evolved around this relationship for decades. When flows were sharply reduced, Europe was forced to reorganise its supply portfolio in a remarkably short period.

Here, LNG played a crucial role. Imports increased fast, and new regasification capacity was developed across several member states. By 2023, LNG accounted for around 40% of EU gas imports[2], positioning Europe from a LNG buffer market to one of the largest LNG-importing regions in the world. This shift significantly increased the role of global price signals and shipping logistics in determining European supply conditions.

At the same time, the crisis prompted institutional responses to reinforce resilience in the short- to medium-term. To this end, EU storage regulations were strengthened, requiring Member States to reach minimum filling levels before the winter season. As a result, storage levels reached around 95% of capacity ahead of the 2023 winter[3], significantly above historical averages.

These actions, alongside demand-side measures, helped stabilise the system during the most severe phase of the crisis, but they also changed the nature of Europe’s exposure to energy markets. The system that emerged after 2022 is less dependent on a single pipeline supplier, yet more deeply embedded in the global gas trade

Understanding the current situation, therefore, requires moving beyond the idea of “another gas crisis”. The issue is not simply whether new shocks may occur, but how vulnerability operates in a gas system that has already been structurally reconfigured.

Where the system is now exposed

The reconfiguration of the European gas system has not introduced a new set of vulnerabilities per se, but rather a different exposure to vulnerabilities and a different ripple effect of the shocks on the system. And in globally integrated energy markets, crises do not always emerge primarily from decreases in physical volumes, but rather from global price dynamics, competition for LNG cargoes, and the logistical systems that move energy across regions with more flexibility. Consequently, disruptions increasingly emerge not only from resource scarcity, but also from the functioning of the systems that move them.

To this end, across oil, LNG, and refined products, we see that a significant share of flows transits through a limited number of maritime chokepoints. Roughly 20% of globally traded oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz[4], making it one of the most critical corridors in global energy logistics.

When geopolitical tensions affect these corridors, what concerns most is not necessarily that energy resources disappear, but that they become harder, slower or more expensive to move reliably between producers and consumers, and that systems enter the crisis with volume surplus but with fragile logistics.

Stockpiling of resources, therefore, plays a key role in stabilising energy systems during periods of disruption. In the oil market, coordinated releases from strategic reserves have historically been coordinated by the IEA and used to flush price spikes and signal market confidence. In the current crisis, the IEA has announced its largest-ever collective oil stock release, with 32 member countries agreeing to make 400 million barrels of emergency oil available in an attempt to stabilise markets[5]. Gas markets rely on different mechanisms, but the underlying logic is similar. Storage acts as a buffer, allowing systems to absorb shocks while supply chains and markets adjust and find a new equilibrium.

At the end of this winter, European underground gas storage is expected to be only around 22–27% full, compared with a five-year average of around 41%. This implies a significantly larger refill requirement over the summer months. Analysts estimate that Europe may need to secure around 67 bcm of gas, approximately 700 LNG cargoes, to refill storage ahead of next winter[6].

While this does not imply an immediate physical shortage, it reduces the margin of flexibility available if supply disruptions persist or if global competition for LNG intensifies. The pressing issue today is the system’s ability to attract supply to replenish it tomorrow.

Policy choices in a new order  

Another dimension of the crisis is how the reconfiguration of the system is also affecting policy responses available to governments.

During the 2022–2023 crisis, many European countries introduced large-scale support measures to protect households and firms from extremely high energy prices. These interventions were politically and economically justified in the context of an abrupt and unprecedented shock.

Today, the situation is not quite the same: fiscal space is more constrained, and policymakers are more aware of the potential side effects of broad price interventions. Measures that might interfere with price signals risk weakening the mechanisms by which global gas markets allocate flexible supply and could have wider ripple effects on a global scale. This issue is particularly relevant in the context of LNG trade. When European prices rise, they attract cargoes that might otherwise be delivered to other importing regions. On the other hand, policies that artificially lower prices may make Europe less competitive in securing flexible LNG volumes, especially during periods of tight supply.

Now, the challenge for EU policymakers is therefore not only to protect EU consumers from excessive price volatility, but also to preserve the signals that allow energy flows to adjust across the world’s regions in an even more intertwined global market. Thus, proposals such as gas price caps, which periodically reappear in the policy debate, remain controversial. While they may provide short-term relief for consumers, their interaction with globally integrated gas markets requires careful consideration.

System memory after major shocks

Energy systems rarely return to their exact previous equilibrium after major shocks. Even when physical disruptions are temporary, the experience of vulnerability tends to reshape expectations about risk, reliability and resilience.

The 2022 European gas crisis has already triggered significant adaptations, such as governments strengthening storage obligations, accelerating the use of regasification infrastructure, and intensifying efforts to diversify supply sources, as well as governments and market participants revising procurement strategies, placing greater emphasis on flexibility and redundancy. And these shifts may be reinforced by the recent geopolitical tensions.

Disruptions affecting maritime routes or global energy trade can, for instance, change perceptions of logistical risk, influencing decisions on shipping routes and reserve management. Importers may place greater value on strategic reserves, exporters may invest in alternative export routes, and infrastructure planning may increasingly prioritise redundancy together with efficiency.

Whether that memory becomes an asset or a constraint will depend on how it is translated into system design and policy choices. A system shaped by the memory of vulnerability is likely to become more complex and more capital-intensive than one optimised on pure cost. In that sense, the crises do not simply disrupt energy systems but also reshape the assumptions on which those systems operate, and the question, in the end, becomes how complexity is managed: deliberately or simply accumulated over time. Before the next shock emerges, not in response to it.

[1] European Commission, REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (2022).
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en

Council of the European Union, Where does the EU’s gas come from?
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/where-does-the-eu-s-gas-come-from/

[2] International Energy Agency (IEA), Gas Market Report 2024.
https://www.iea.org/reports/gas-market-report-q1-2024

[3] Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE), AGSI+ Storage Database. https://agsi.gie.eu/

[4] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint. https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/Strait_of_Hormuz

[5] IEA, IEA member countries to carry out largest ever oil stock release amid market disruptions from Middle East conflict, press release, 2026. https://www.iea.org/news/iea-member-countries-to-carry-out-largest-ever-oil-stock-release-amid-market-disruptions-from-middle-east-conflict

[6] Reuters, Europe faces gas storage scramble as Iran conflict tightens supply (5 March 2026).
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/europe-faces-gas-storage-scramble-iran-conflict-tightens-supply-2026-03-05/

 Read more

For a broader analysis of the structural evolution of European gas markets, see Sesini M., Nicolle A., Conti I., Piebalgs A. (eds.) European Gas Markets in Transition (Edward Elgar, 2026).