Journal of evolutionary economics, 2023, OnlineFirstAn environmental policy to foster virtuous behaviour does not automatically establish a social norm in a population; that is, the policy might not be socially acceptable or enforceable. Some agents feel compelled to abide by environmental social norms and embrace them, but others do not. Some might want to imitate their peers, while others might prefer not to conform and play the role of a maverick. In this model, we describe the heterogeneity of preferences by proposing a taxonomy of five possible agent types that enrich the traditional triplet presented in the literature. We then employ a random matching model to study how a social norm spreads within a population when its composition changes. Considering three relevant population compositions (scenarios), we show that what is most important for the successful diffusion of social norms is not whether, but why agents abide by it.
The EU ETS with companion policies is more robust than relying solely on either regulatory or carbon-pricing interventions. Policies should be developed to account for the disparate impacts of the [...]
Customers are expected to play a fundamental role in the transition to a decarbonised and digitalised energy system. However, experience so far suggests that customer engagement in energy markets cannot [...]
This deliverable, which is part of the Horizon 2020 OneNet project, outlines the alignment activities carried out in OneNet Task 3.4, focusing on integrating the proposed electricity market concepts with [...]
Flexibility involves the adjustment of energy consumption or generation schedules to benefit the grid, for instance, providing services such as balancing, congestion management, and voltage control. Flexibility can be offered [...]