We analyze competition between vertically-integrated operators who build infrastructure and provide access in different geographical areas. Under full commitment, the regulator sets socially-optimal access rates that depend on the local degree of infrastructure competition. If he can only commit to implementing a single access. price, the regulator can impose a uniform access price or deregulate access in competitive areas. While uniform access pricing leads to suboptimal investment, deregulation can spur investment. Still, deregulation is not an ideal solution to the commitment problem, as it tends to involve multiple and inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level, with either too little or too much investment
Adequate, reliable and well interconnected energy networks are a prerequisite for a well functioning internal energy market and for meeting EU’s energy and climate policy objectives on greenhouse gases, cost-competitiveness [...]
Electricity network companies can innovate their own network business or stimulate system innovation, including by facilitating market activities and the integration of renewable energy sources. Regulation is essential to turn [...]
To enable deep electrification of the economy, a significant expansion of grid distribution capacity will be required. However, how much grid investments eventually will be needed depends on how the [...]
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