Having identified the basic characteristics of the current energy crisis and its particular shape in the European Union, three questions immediately arise. 1) If gas is at the ‘core’ of the EU mix of energy crises, why hastily reform the internal electricity market? Is the electricity market badly affecting the gas crisis, amplifying it or worsening its consequences? Are we short of sufficiently good emergency tools to immediately intervene against the detrimental effects of the EU gas crisis on the EU electricity market and vice versa? 2) If one assumes that most of the detrimental price effects of the gas crisis can be addressed with regular EU emergency tools, should we nevertheless revisit the EU electricity market to make it stronger vis-à-vis such a major energy shock? Would strengthening our internal EU electricity market against future energy shocks reinforce or weaken our well-established policy of securing an EU decarbonisation path to 2030 or 2050? 3) If strengthening and reforming our EU electricity market can help our EU electrification strategy and our general path to decarbonisation, can we already foresee other conditions and constraints which could slow down or block this securitisation of our energy future?