Climate policy, 2019, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 439-452This paper analyses the rules for free allocation in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The analysis draws on the empirical evidence emerging from two literature strands. One group of studies sheds light on the following questions: how efficient are free allocation rules in minimizing the risk of carbon leakage? Have they become more efficient over the trading periods? What are the technical limits to making them more efficient? Further: is firm behaviour affected by allowance allocation? Did specific provisions induce strategic behaviour with unintended effects? Studies from the second group estimate sectoral pass-through rates for the costs imposed by the EU ETS. Taking cost pass-through into account is necessary for properly targeting free allocation. The difficulty of accurately quantifying sectoral differences in cost pass-through ability, especially in manufacturing sectors (due to limited data availability and market heterogeneity), is the main hindrance to achieving further efficiency in allowance allocation. The new rules defined in the reform for Phase IV (2021–2030) nevertheless make some progress in this direction.
We examine the optimal behavior of carbon-emitting companies operating under the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), under which firms are obliged to purchase emission permits on the secondary [...]
The Brief explores pathways to promote a sustainable agricultural trade regime for the EU. We identify three challenges and propose three potential paths forward. We discuss potential implications of the [...]
The rewable energy resources within EU27 are highly dominated by wind and solar energy delivering electricity as output. As electrification is the most efficient way to deliver the energy services [...]
Manufacturing firms in the EU face the double challenge of decarbonisation and (international) competitive pressure. Based on the key findings of the 2024 EIB investment survey and considering the economic [...]
Regulation 1370/2007, as amended by the Fourth Railway Package, set the date of 25 December 2023 for the opening to competition of services subject to public service obligations. As opposed [...]
This policy brief contends that a new approach to Long Term Contracts (LTCs) in European competition policy based on new facts, new realities and a revised reasoning must be urgently [...]
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