We analyze competition between vertically-integrated operators who build infrastructure and provide access in different geographical areas. Under full commitment, the regulator sets socially-optimal access rates that depend on the local degree of infrastructure competition. If he can only commit to implementing a single access. price, the regulator can impose a uniform access price or deregulate access in competitive areas. While uniform access pricing leads to suboptimal investment, deregulation can spur investment. Still, deregulation is not an ideal solution to the commitment problem, as it tends to involve multiple and inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level, with either too little or too much investment
Electrification has moved from a sectoral aspiration to the backbone of the European Union’s decarbonisation strategy, because it alone enables a sustainable break with imported fossil fuels. Yet as this [...]
The energy consumers are entering a new era of digitalisation in the energy market, and as a result, gaining access to innovative offers and services that were before non-existent to [...]
The literature on a ‘just transition’ has grown exponentially over the last decade. The success of the just transition scholarship is due to the earlier endorsement and dissemination of a [...]
Join our community
To meet, discuss and learn in the channel that suits you best.
We use cookies to help personalise content and provide a better experience. By clicking Accept all, you agree to this, as outlined in our Cookie Policy. To change preferences or withdraw consent, please update your Cookie Preferences.
Read it on Cadmus Download in open access
