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***MEASURES TO BE CONSIDERED IN
IMPROVING THE SLOT REGIME'S
EFFICIENCY***

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The Current Slot Regime Works Well ...For the Airlines



It works well because there is...

- Certainty of access due to historic rights.
- Flexibility due to late return dates, slot mobility, and 20 % buffer.
- Fairness due to equal treatment of all aircraft operators (with scheduled services) and independent work of coordinators.
- Transparency due to corresponding obligations for coordinators.

„ The prime objective of airport coordination is to **ensure the most efficient use of airport infrastructure** in order **to maximize benefits to the greatest number of airport users.**“ WSG 9th Edition, 1.2.1

Tragedy of the Commons



Definition:

“The **tragedy of the commons** is a situation in a shared-resource system where individual users, acting independently according to their own self-interest, behave contrary to the common good of all users, by depleting or spoiling that resource through their collective action.” *From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*

The objective of “to maximize benefits to the greatest number of airport users” will not lead to the “most efficient use of airport infrastructure” !

Example Fairness: Equal Treatment of Aircraft Operators with Scheduled Services



1



2

D ABC123 SH36 21:45 F 1Apr 26OCT 1234567 CVT



D DEF321 A388 21:55 J 1Apr 26 Oct 1234567 SIN

① = daily cargo service of airline ABC to Coventry with small freighter (Shorts 360)

② = daily passenger service of airline DEF to SIN with A380

Measures to be considered



amend definition of slot:

= „...permission **and obligation** ...to use the full range of infrastructure...“

1. definition of slot

- emphasises slot is a common valuable good, and wasting is not without consequences
- slot reservation fees
- immediate sanctions in case of confirmed misuse
- better balance bundle of „80/20“, „minimum series length“, „force majeure“, „calculation of historic“

Measures to be considered



- 2 . Allow for more allocation criteria (“additional criteria”) such as
 - aircraft operator (individual ranking based on slot performance in previous seasons, use of “priority code”, see WSG)
 - a/c type
 - service type
 - destination

3. Allow for prioritizing the additional criteria on a local level (=“Local rules”) and be more transparent about the application

Measures to be considered



4. Ease access to market, change New Entrant rule

5. Secondary trading

Pro: -trading -> larger aircraft, longer flights

-additional opportunity for airlines to improve slot portfolio

Con: - leasing -> smaller aircraft, shorter flights

-> no return to slot pool - > "shadow coordination"

- slots as asset on the balance sheet

6. Peak Pricing

Pro: - expected to reduce peak time demand
- easy to implement

Con: - questionable, whether incentive could be strong enough
(airport charges are only a small part of the overall costs of a flight)
- only works if there are still off peak periods; does **not** work at super congested airports
- the structure of airport charges at many airports is also used to stimulate additional traffic and/or to give incentives for use of less noisier aircraft ; peak pricing might be contradicting

Measures to be considered



7. Auctions

Pro: Clearest definition of efficiency

Con: -huge uncertainty about the outcome (e.g. even more dominant carries at the hubs; improved competition ?) Is „economic efficiency“ what we are looking for ?

- practicality (complexity, limited time, costs)
- stability of the schedule ?
- obligation to use auctioned slot ? Interaction with current regime

A wide-angle photograph of an airport tarmac at sunset. The sky is filled with vibrant orange, red, and purple clouds. In the foreground, a runway is marked with green lights. In the middle ground, a Star Alliance aircraft is parked at a gate, and other smaller planes are visible. The airport terminal and control tower are illuminated in the background.

***Gute Reise!
We make it happen***

Gunter Heinrich