

Emission Trading and Overlapping Environmental Support: Installation-level Evidence from the EU ETS

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Motivation

- ▶ EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) **creates carbon price**
 - ▶ Market for tradeable emission permits with progressively tightening cap on annual emissions of large emitters
 - ▶ Extensively studied (Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Calel and Dechezleprêtre, 2016; Calel, 2020; Abrell et al., 2022; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023; Colmer et al., 2024)

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- ▶ Increasing number of environmental support policies at **national level**
 - ▶ Evidence on effects of some policies in isolation (Martin et al., 2014; Abrell and Kosch, 2022; Ferrara and Giua, 2022; Gerster and Lamp, 2024; Basaglia et al., 2024)

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- ▶ Interaction between EU ETS and overlapping national support understudied
 - ▶ Simulation-based evidence (Anke et al., 2020; Delarue and Van den Bergh, 2016; Bruninx et al., 2020)
 - ▶ This paper provides novel **empirical evidence**

Motivation

“In the first half of 2017, we decided to retrofit our hard coal-fired power plants Eemshaven and Amer 9 for co-firing with biomass. The Dutch state approved subsidies of up to €2.6 billion for the two plants.”

RWE AG, annual report 2017

“The [Memorandum of Understanding] states the commitment of ArcelorMittal and the Government of Spain to transition towards a decarbonised steel industry. [...] The Government of Spain is exploring regulatory instruments to support the industry in the transition process, such as compensation programmes for electricity-intensive industries, tools to promote improved energy efficiency [...]”

ArcelorMittal, press release 13/07/2021

Preview of results

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- ▶ Quantify **national environmental support** overlapping with the EU ETS
 - ▶ renewable energy support for power producers: more than 260 billion EUR since 2012 (on average ~ 30 EUR per tCO₂)
 - ▶ cost compensation for energy-intensive undertakings: more than 100 billion EUR since 2012 (on average ~ 7 EUR per tCO₂)

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 - ▶ difference-in-differences exploiting variation in carbon price exposure
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- ▶ Estimate **interactions** of national environmental support with the EU ETS
 - ▶ triple difference exploiting variation in national environmental support
 - ▶ positive interaction: power producers in countries with high levels of renewable support reduce emissions significantly more (by ~ 20 p.p.)
 - ▶ negative interaction: manufacturers in countries with high levels of cost compensation reduce emissions significantly less (by ~ 6 p.p.)

Empirical Strategy

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- ▶ Unexpected regulatory tightening of the EU ETS in 2017 [details](#)

$$\text{Post}_t = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } t > 2016, \\ 0, & \text{else.} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

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- ▶ Carbon price exposure depends on emission intensity [details](#)

$$\mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if emitter } i \text{ is high-exposed,} \\ 0, & \text{else.} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

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- ▶ Variation in overlapping national support [details](#)

$$\mathbb{1}_{cj}^{\alpha} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if pre-shock support in country-industry } cj \text{ is high,} \\ 0, & \text{else.} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Empirical specification

- ▶ Difference-in-differences: the **effect of the carbon price shock**

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Emissions}_{it} = & \beta_0 + X_{it} + \lambda_i + \tau_t + \epsilon_{it} \\ & + \beta_1 \times \text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i} \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

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- ▶ Installation fixed effects λ_i and year fixed effects τ_t
 - ▶ Also account for time-varying heterogeneity at year-industry-activity (τ_{tja}^1), year-country (τ_{tc}^2), year-industry-activity-country (τ_{tjac}^3)

Power producers and renewable energy support

Effect of the carbon price shock on power producers

descriptives

event study

	(1)	(2)
$\text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i}$	-0.516*** (0.056)	-0.674*** (0.061)
Dependent variable	Emissions	Emissions
Fixed effects	λ_i, τ_t	λ_i, τ_{tc}^2
Energy price controls	Yes	Yes
Cluster variable	Installation	Installation
Clusters	832	831
Observations	9,114	9,102
Pseudo R^2	0.939	0.944
Estimator	Poisson QML	Poisson QML

	(1)	(2)
$\text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i}$	-0.364*** (0.063)	-0.517*** (0.062)
$\text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i} \times \mathbb{1}_{cj}^{\text{res}}$	-0.393*** (0.110)	-0.341*** (0.129)
Dependent variable	Emissions	Emissions
Fixed effects	λ_i, τ_t	λ_i, τ_{tc}^2
Energy price controls	Yes	Yes
Cluster variable	Installation	Installation
Clusters	832	831
Observations	9,114	9,102
Pseudo R^2	0.940	0.944
Estimator	Poisson QML	Poisson QML

Manufacturing and compensation for energy-intensive undertakings

The effect of the carbon price shock on manufacturing

descriptives

event study

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i}$	-0.032** (0.016)	-0.032** (0.014)	-0.035*** (0.014)	-0.035*** (0.013)
Dependent variable	Emissions	Emissions	Emissions	Emissions
Fixed effects	λ_i, τ_{tja}^1	λ_i, τ_{tja}^1	λ_i, τ_{tjac}^3	λ_i, τ_{tjac}^3
Energy price controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Cluster variable	Installation	Installation	Installation	Installation
Clusters	2,873	2,873	2,712	2,712
Observations	31,535	31,535	29,747	29,747
Pseudo R^2	0.988	0.988	0.990	0.990
Estimator	Poisson QML	Poisson QML	Poisson QML	Poisson QML

Compensation for energy-intensive undertakings

descriptives

exposure

event study

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i}$	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.053*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.020)	-0.063*** (0.018)
$\text{Post}_t \times \mathbb{1}^{\text{CPE}_i} \times \mathbb{1}_{cj}^{\text{eiu}}$	0.064** (0.030)	0.060** (0.027)	0.079*** (0.025)	0.079*** (0.023)
Dependent variable	Emissions	Emissions	Emissions	Emissions
Fixed effects	λ_i, τ_{tja}^1	λ_i, τ_{tja}^1	λ_i, τ_{tjac}^3	λ_i, τ_{tjac}^3
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Conclusion


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- ▶ We find **significant interactions** between the EU ETS and national support
 - ▶ positive interaction with renewable energy support for power producers
 - ▶ negative interaction with cost compensation for energy-intensive industries
- ▶ Currently investigating **underlying mechanisms**
 - ▶ changes in output (e.g, partial cessations or capacity extensions)
 - ▶ retrofits of installations (e.g., biomass co-firing)
 - ▶ investments in new installations (e.g., electric arc furnaces)

Thanks!

Draft available [here](#).

Appendix


Regulatory tightening of the EU ETS [back](#)



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
Regulatory tightening of the EU ETS [back](#)




Regulatory tightening of the EU ETS [back](#)




Carbon price exposure [back](#)



Carbon price exposure [back](#)



Renewable energy support [back](#)




Renewable energy support

[back](#)

high support



■ 0

■ 1




Power baseline [back](#)

CPE_t —●— 0 —◆— 1





Power baseline [back](#)




Renewable energy support [back](#)

$\overset{1}{CPE}_t$ —●— 0 —◆— 1





Renewable energy support [back](#)




Manufacturing baseline [back](#)

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



Manufacturing baseline [back](#)




Compensation for energy-intensive undertakings [back](#)


\uparrow CPE_t —●— 0 —◆— 1



Carbon price exposure of manufacturing installations [back](#)



Compensation for energy-intensive undertakings [back](#)



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