

EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS AND CARBON REMOVALS

Stefano De Clara Head of Secretariat International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP)

15 November 2024




ABOUT ICAP


An international **forum** of **43 national & subnational** governments to **exchange** knowledge and experiences on emissions trading systems (**ETS**)

- Share **best practices** & learn from each others' experiences
- Facilitate **development and improvement** of carbon markets
- Explore the **role** of emissions trading in decarbonization




EMISSIONS TRADING IN NUMBERS





EMISSIONS TRADING WORLDWIDE






ETS AND THE MARKET FOR REMOVALS









MODELS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN ETS & MARKET FOR REMOVALS



Connected with restrictions (Model C)



Connected through Government (Model B)



Integrated markets (Model D)





SOME EXAMPLES OF REMOVALS IN COMPLIANCE CARBON PRICING

(DRAFT - CORRECTIONS WELCOMED!)

System	Quantitative limits	Eligibility for removals	Permanence for removals (examples)
California cap and trade	Up to 4% of compliance obligations (Some 200 million forestry credits since 2013. Prices currently between 16 and 30 USD/t)	Mostly forestry, Domestic	Demand-side liability, buffer pool, 100 years monitoring obligation
Québec ETS	Up to 8% of compliance obligations	Mostly forestry, Domestic	Supply-side liability, buffer pool, tonne-year accounting
New Zealand ETS	No limit (forest owners receive fully fungible allowances) (70 million tonnes since 2008. Prices currently 40 USD/t)	Forestry, Domestic	Supply-side liability (obligation to surrender allowances), no monitoring sunset
China ETS	Up to 5% of verified emissions	Forestry & AFOLU, Domestic	Discounting at issuance, 20-40 years monitoring
Colombian carbon tax	Up to 50% of covered GHG emissions	Mostly forestry, Domestic	Addressed by the crediting mechanism – e.g. VCS buffer pool



REMOVALS IN COMPLIANCE CARBON PRICING: WHY / WHY NOT?

- Instrument for **compliance cost control** (depends on cost of abatement vs cost of removal)
- Increasing **market liquidity** (higher supply of units, plus increase in gross emissions)
- Providing an **incentive for CDR** development and deployment (depends on cost of abatement vs cost of removal)

Flexibility in emissions outcomes (e.g. net zero tax or ETS)



Risk of **undermining environmental integrity with low-quality units** (reversals, quantification)



Loss of control over decarbonization pathways


Risk of abatement deterrence

- Short term replacement of abatement with removal can be addressed with limits & cap adjustments
- Long term effects (delays in abatement investment due to uncertainty in future removal costs and availability) much harder to manage



THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF ETSs IS AN OPEN QUESTION WITH MULTIPLE POSSIBILITIES


ETS emission levels may or may not mirror broader jurisdictional goals



28/11/2024 ETS, RELOADED? DESIGNING EMISSIONS TRADING FOR NET-ZERO AND NET-NEGATIVE SOCIETIES - SNEAK PREVIEW

SOME TAKEAWAYS

- The future trajectory of ETSs is an open question with **multiple** possibilities
- 2. ETS emission levels may or may not mirror broader jurisdictional goals
- 3. Definitions of 'residual' and 'hard-to-abate' emissions are crucial
- 4. Some ETS designs vulnerable to the **risk that is CDR not viable at scale**
- 5. ETSs could provide support to CDR, but are **unlikely to suffice**
- 6. Understanding the **policy mix for net-negative emissions** is crucial for defining the role of ETSs in long-term climate strategies






ADDITIONAL ICAP RESOURCES




ICAP Website & ETS Map



Infographics



News



Publications



ETS Briefs



Allowance Price Explorer



THANK YOU!

