# Supporting Postal Services through Location-Based Fees

#### Tim Brennan

Professor Emeritus, School of Public Policy, UMBC brennan@umbc.edu

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Center for Research in Regulated Industries Rutgers Business School

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## Background

- · I had proposed method for adjusting price with falling volumes
  - o PC 2016
  - o For PRC "Public Representative", PAEA 10<sup>th</sup> (my opinions only here)
- · PRC proposed adjustment based on falling "density", volumes per "location"
- Implied cost coverage through location fees ≈ \$100/year/location
- · Compute; explore implications

## Recap

### Brennan-Crew adjustment formula

$$o \frac{\Delta P}{P} = -\frac{\Delta q}{q} \frac{F}{C + Fe_D}$$

- o Elasticity of average cost e<sub>AC</sub>, for scale
- o Elasticity of demand en, for feedback
- o With constant MC, F = fixed cost, C = total cost

#### · US PRC decision

$$o \frac{\Delta P}{P} = -\frac{\Delta d}{d} \frac{F}{C}$$

- o "d" = volume/locations, aka "delivery points"
- o (Ignore not adjusting for feedback)

## Implication for fees

- · PRC formula implies no change in average cost if "density" constant
- · If C = cost, Q = volume, N = location
- $\cdot = > C(Q, N) = QC_Q + NC_{N}$
- · If marginal costs of volume, location constant as M, V respectively,
- $\cdot$  C(Q, N) = MQ + VN
- · Recover all costs with marginal cost prices and location fee

#### What is V?

- · Since locations get all kinds of mail, compute for market-dominant) services
  - o Lower postages for each service = its MC
- V = "Institutional cost"/"delivery points"
- · 2020 Institutional cost = \$16.6B
  - o \$14.8B from services that contributed + \$1.8B from those that were short
- · 2020 delivery points = 161.4 million
- $\cdot = V = $102.85/year = $8.57/month$

### So what's the problem? #1 : Numerator

- Dividing USPS fixed costs between market-dominant, competitive services
  - o Institutional cost recovery result of pricing
  - o BC perspective only maintaining solvency
- Location fee invites cross-subsidization complaints
- · Responses
  - o Set USPS competitive prices as market would (Brennan, 2020)
  - o Price-cap fees without regard to "cost"

# So what's the problem? #2 : Denominator

- · What's a "delivery point"?
  - o USPS: "A single mailbox or other place to which mail is delivered. A street address does not necessarily represent a single delivery point because a street address such as one for an apartment building may have several delivery points."
- · Some delivery costs vary
  - o Apartments, cluster boxes, urban home delivery, rural
  - o Corporate, government, etc. "mail room"
- · USPS claims mix doesn't change, only population
- · Sorting costs same regardless of delivery point?

## Implementation resistance #1: Equal fee per delivery point

- Those using cluster boxes, in apartments resent paying same fee as those with home delivery, rural customers?
- · But we already have average cost pricing
- · Similar urban/rural divide?

## Implementation resistance #2: Equal fee regardless of volume?

- Current system: Those who get more mail (implicitly) pay more
- · "Why should I pay the same fee? I hardly get mail!"
- · Prior controversy: Telephones
  - o Highly inefficient subsidy of fixed lines with long-distance surcharges
- · Regulatory pricing "original sin"
  - o Electricity, water

## Implementation resistance #3: Dropping off the grid?

- · What if some people decide mail isn't worth \$100/year?
  - o Bills, personal correspondence, catalogs come on-line
  - o Kramer on Seinfeld: https://youtu.be/On3cQ0sPvSY
- · USPS formula assumed everyone got mail
  - o Implied "marginal cost" really average cost
- Network externalities, low MC => fee mandatory
  - o Opposition to mandatory fee in principle
  - o Reinforces cross-subsidy concern

## Implementation issue #4: Price caps for delivery fees?

- · MC cost recovery does not necessarily imply return to cost-of-service regulation
- · Apply price-caps to location fees, as well so to (50% lower) market-dominant service postage
- · Gives USPS incentive to reduce deliverypoint costs
- · Use expected efficiency to reduce fee

## Concluding observations

- · PRC approach implies efficient cost recovery through \$100/year delivery point fee
  - o Less than Amazon Prime, but no video!
- · Numerator, denominator problematic
- · Implementation resistance predictable
- · Is the PRC's density approach credible?