### Welfare, Redistributive and Revenue Effects of Policies Promoting Fuel Efficient and Electric Vehicles

#### Patrick Bigler Doina Radulescu

University of Bern, Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research and CESifo

June 11th, 2021

FSR Annual Conference 'Infrastructure Investment Challenges: Reconciling Competition, Decarbonisation and Digitalisation'

### Motivation - CO2 Emissions Transport Sector Switzerland

- Passenger car emissions increased by 44% since 2000 and represent 60% of road related emissions in Europe
- In Switzerland, the road transport sector accounts for around 39% of overall CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.
- Challenge: Achieve net zero emissions by 2050 while individual traffic projected to increase by 18% until 2040.



### Research Questions

- What factors drive households' preferences towards electric and hybrid cars?
- How likely are different policies to increase the uptake of environmentally friendly cars? (i.e. Subsidy, fuel tax, mileage dependent charge)
- What are the effects of these policies across the income distribution?

Demand model (Grigolon, Reynaert, Verboven, 2018; Xing, Leard and Li, 2021) Household *i's* utility from purchasing new vehicle *j* :

$$u_{ij} = \beta^{x} x_{j} + \beta^{z} z_{i} x_{j} + \alpha_{1} (\log(p_{j}) + \gamma(G_{ij} + T_{j})) + \alpha_{2} \frac{\log(p_{j})}{y_{i}} + \epsilon_{ij}$$
(1)  
Variable Costs:

$$G_{ij} = \rho m_i [e_j g_j (1 + \tau_j^g) + \tau_j^m]$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

$$T_j = \rho t_j \tag{3}$$

Capitalization factor:

$$\rho = \sum_{s=1}^{S} \frac{1}{(1+r)^s}$$
(4)

r=6%; S=10 years Assumption:

Households take prices and taxes as given

Future expectation is based on today's value

Inelastic mileage

### Conditional Logit

Probability of household *i* to choose vehicle type *j*:

$$P_{ij} = \frac{e^{\beta^{x} x_{j} + \beta^{z} z_{i} x_{j} + \alpha_{1} (\log(p_{j}) + \gamma(G_{ij} + T_{j})) + \alpha_{2} \frac{\log(p_{j})}{y_{i}}}{\sum_{j} e^{\beta^{x} x_{j} + \beta^{z}_{j} z_{i} x_{j} + \alpha_{1} (\log(p_{j}) + \gamma(G_{ij} + T_{j})) + \alpha_{2} \frac{\log(p_{j})}{y_{i}}}$$
(5)

### $\epsilon_{ij}$ i.i.d. Type 1 extreme value distributed Choice Set

Each household's choice set consist of 489 theoretical options based on fuel type (Gasoline, Diesel, Hybrid, Electric) and make-model segmentation (i.e. VW Golf, Audi A6)

- ▶ include car type fe; brand country of origin fe
- address price endogeneity by using a cost shifter and control function approach (Train and Petrin, 2011) - annual penalties for fleet wide fuel efficiency standards car importers are subject to.
- Also include typical BLP instruments

#### The Dataset

We have access to several datasets for households in the Canton of Bern, merging data from

1. Tax office of Bern

Income, wealth, household size, marital status, age

- 2. Road Traffic Office Canton of Bern
  - Data on new car registrations between 2008-2019 (ownership in 2019)
- 3. Eurotax, Federal Roads Office (Switzerland) and LEMNET
  - Vehicle prices, Fuel efficiency, engine power, car size
  - Data on number and location of EV charging stations

#### Conditional logit - estimated coefficients

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Car price (log)	-0.227 • • •	-0.034	-2.116 • • •
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Price (log) / income	0.002+	0.003+	0.002+
(-6/)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Variable costs (log rai)	-0.684 * **	-0.520 + ++	-0.350 + ++
Ant mixe course (rold by)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Engine nound (KW)	-0.000	-0.001+	0.007 + ++
ragine points (it ii)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Contrainty	0.00)	0.00)	(0.00)
Car neight	(0.00)	(0.10)	-1.000 • ••
a	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Car weight	0.000	-0.001 • • •	0.001 • ••
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Hybrid engine	-0.751 • • •	-0.690 • ••	-0.205
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Electric engine	-1.983 • ••	-1.731 • ••	-1.178 • ••
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Diesel engine	-0.760 • • •	$-0.732 \bullet \bullet \bullet$	-0.567 • ••
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Car size	-0.127 • • •	-0.033	-0.006
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Size heterogeneity			
2 Persons	0.163 • • •	0.187 • • •	0.184 • • •
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
3 Persons	0.315 • • •	0.362 + ++	0.359 • ••
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
4 Persons	0.516 • • •	0.582 + ++	0.577 + ++
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
5+ Persons	0.714	0.793 + ++	0.785 * **
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
KW heterogeneity	(	()	(1111)
40.60 wasts old	-0.002 • • •	-0.002 + ++	-0.002 + ++
to-ou your out	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
60 :	0.007	0.007	0.007
our years out	-0.000 • • •	(0.00)	(0.00)
UV alleria	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
EV checks	0.911-	0.911.	0.210-
Ev aggiomeration	0.311*	0.311*	0.310+
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
EV rural	-0.023	-0.025	-0.026
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Distance to EV	-0.030	-0.029	-0.029
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nb. Charging (5km)	0.007.	0.007.	0.007+
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
EV 2018	0.133	0.088	0.123
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
EV 2019	1.357 • • •	1.307 • • •	1.359 • ••
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Control function	No	No	Yes
Observations	9,816,000	9,816,000	9,816,000
Nr. of cases	23,074	23,074	23,074
Log Likelihood	-136,093.3	-134,604	-134.380.7
Car type fe	No	Yes	Yes
Car brand (country)	No	Yes	Yes
(country)		1.12	

+p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Coefficients based on estimated conditional and mixed logit model. Estimated standard errors in parentheses. Model (1) - (3) do not have random coefficients. Coefficients in Model (1) and (5) are based on control function approach with estimation of the pricing equation in a separate model based on cost shifters in a first step.

## Increase in fossil fuel levy by 0.12 CHF/I - Change in Probabilities

	Overall	1 <sup>st</sup> inc. quartile	2 <sup>nd</sup> inc quartile	3 <sup>rd</sup> inc quartile	4 <sup>th</sup> inc quartile
Gasoline	-0.00077	-0.00077	-0.00076	-0.00077	-0.00078
Diesel	0.00028	0.00027	0.00028	0.00028	0.00028
Electro	0.00030	0.00031	0.00029	0.00029	0.00030
Hybrid	0.00020	0.00019	0.00020	0.00021	0.00021

### Increase in fossil fuel levy by 0.12 CHF/I - Welfare analysis

	Cons. surplus (MCHF)	CS (% change)	$CO_2$ levy (kCHF)	Levy incidence (%)	Cartaxes (CHF)	$CO_2$ (t)	CO2 (% change)
1 <sup>st</sup> inc quartile	-1.530	-0.0999	195.65	0.204	-228.33	- 2.084	-0.054
2 <sup>nd</sup> inc quartile	-1.585	- 0.105	191.34	0.106	-217.40	-1.978	-0.052
3 <sup>rd</sup> inc quartile	-1.710	- 0.109	197.7	0.077	-223.07	-2.079	-0.055
4 <sup>th</sup> inc quartile	- 2. 04 4	- 0.108	188.89	0.036	-231.23	- 2.027	-0.054
Total	-6.870	-0.106	773.56	0.073	-900.02	-8.171	- 0. 05 3

Notes: 1<sup>st</sup> quartile: income < 62.9 kCHF, 2<sup>nd</sup> quartile: 62.9>=income < 93.67 kCHF, 3<sup>rd</sup> quartile: 93.67>= income <131.7 kCHF and 4<sup>th</sup> quartile: income >= 131.7 kCHF. Consumer surplus based on logsum formula.

## Introduction of mileage tax (0.023 CHF/km) - Change in Probabilities

	Overall	$1^{st}$ inc. quartile	2 <sup>nd</sup> inc quartile	3 <sup>rd</sup> inc quartile	4 <sup>th</sup> inc quartile
Gasoline	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018
Diese	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002
Electro	-0.0012	-0.0012	-0.0011	-0.0011	-0.0012
Hybrid	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0004	-0.0005	-0.0005

 $\mathit{Notes:}$  1st quartile: income < 62.9 kCHF, 2nd quartile: 62.9>=income < 93.67 kCHF, 3rd quartile: 93.67>= income < 131.7 kCHF and 4th quartile: income >= 131.7 kCHF.

# Introduction of mileage tax (0.023 CHF/km) - Welfare analysis

	Cons. surplus (MCHF)	CS (% change)	Mileage tax (kCHF)	Incidence (%)	Car taxes (CHF)	$CO_2$ (t)	$CO_2$ (% change)
1 <sup>st</sup> inc quartile	-5.212	-0.340	666.69	0.696	3,172	13.924	0.360
2 <sup>nd</sup> inc quartile	-5.375	-0.355	65 0.21	0.360	3,046	13.004	0.344
3 <sup>rd</sup> inc quartile	-5.764	-0.367	666.65	0.260	3,039	13.478	0.344
4 <sup>th</sup> inc quartile	- 6.901	-0.367	636.39	0.122	3,023	12.807	0.342
Total	-23.252	-0.358	2,619.92	0.248	12,279	53.213	0.348

Notes: 1<sup>21</sup> quartile: income < 62.9 kCHF, 2<sup>nd</sup> quartile: 62.9>=income< 93.67 kCHF, 3<sup>rd</sup> quartile: 93.67>= income<131.7 kCHF and 4<sup>th</sup> quartile: income >= 131.7 kCHF. Consumer surplus based on bgsum formula.

### EV subsidy (4k CHF) - Change in Probabilities

	Overall	$1^{st}$ inc. quartile	2 <sup>nd</sup> inc quartile	3 <sup>rd</sup> inc quartile	4 <sup>th</sup> inc quartile
Gasoline	-0.0029	-0.0031	-0.0028	-0.0027	-0.0028
Diese	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0010	-0.0010
Electro	0.0041	0.0043	0.0040	0.0039	0.0041
Hybrid	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002
Notes	1 <sup>st</sup> quartil	e income < 62.9	kCHE 2 <sup>nd</sup> quartile	62.9>=income<	- 93.67 kCHF 3 <sup>rd</sup>

*Notes:* 1<sup>st</sup> quartile: income < 62.9 kCHF, 2<sup>na</sup> quartile:  $62.9 \ge income < 93.67$  kCHF, 3<sup>r</sup> quartile:  $93.67 \ge income < 131.7$  kCHF and 4<sup>th</sup> quartile: income >= 131.7 kCHF.

### EV subsidy (4k CHF) - Welfare analysis

	Cons. surplus (kCHF)	CS (% change)	Total subsidy (kCHF)	Car taxes (kCHF)	$CO_2$ emission (t)	CO2 (% change)
1 <sup>st</sup> inc quartile	387.93	0.025	201.53	-3.021	-17.057	-0.44
2 <sup>nd</sup> inc quartile	369.37	0.024	186.90	-2.813	-15.376	-0.406
3 <sup>rd</sup> inc quartile	384.51	0.025	185.64	-2.785	-15.485	-0.396
4 <sup>th</sup> inc quartile	487.83	0.026	193.85	-2.905	-15.370	-0.411
Total	1,629.63	0.025	767.91	-11.524	-63.289	-0.414

Notes:  $1^{at}$  quartile: income < 72.5 kCHF,  $2^{ad}$  quartile: 72.5>=income < 101.6 kCHF,  $3^{rd}$  quartile: 101.6>= income <138.6 kCHF and  $4^{tb}$  quartile: income >= 138.6 kCHF. Consumer surplus based on logsum formula.

### Conclusion

- Overall probability to acquire a gasoline, hybrid or EV amounts to 67%, 5% and 1.7% respectively
- ► Increase in fuel tax
  - Decreases consumer surplus; small reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the new car fleet; regressive effects
- Introduction of EV subsidy
  - Increases consumer surplus; significantly decreases CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the new car fleet; requires moderate outlays
- Introduction of mileage tax
  - Increases probability to buy gasoline driven cars; increases CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the new car fleet; highly regressive