# Consumer rationality and pricing: an experimental study applied to the water and electricity sectors 

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## What are we talking about?



# Context : multidimentional paradigm shift, Retail competition, smart meters \& climate change 



- Consume less

- Consume « better » (flexibility, prosumer, renewable sources)
$\Rightarrow$ Need for new tarif to send the «right signal» $\rightarrow$ incite consumer to adopt proper behaviors $\leftrightarrow$ « smart consumers »: saving


## Diversity of tariffs

## Time variant pricing (TVP)

Real-time pricing (RTP)
Time-of-use pricing (TOU)
Variable Peak pricing (VPP)
Critical peak pricing (CPP)
Peak-time rebates (PTR)
Critical Peak Rebate (CPR)

## Others

## Flat tariffs

Two-part tariffs
Tiered Rates

- Increasing-block rate
- Declining block rate

Pre-paid tariff
Pay monthly bill with carryover
Pay monthly bill without carryover
Green tariffs
....
,

Which one to choose ?

## Research questions

1. How do consumers perceive tariff?
2. How do consumers accept tariff (adapt their behaviors accordingly) ?

$\rightarrow$ Methodology : field experiment

## Our experiment in the lab

1. Assess subjects' attitude toward different tariff (+/- complex)
2. Identify specific biases that may hinder comprehension and acceptability by consumers
3. Disentangle the different motivations for the rejection of more complex tariff
4. Identify a "good effect": Water vs. Electricity


## Experimental design

Frame field experiment

- Non standard subjects pool: representative consumers (electricity \& water)
- Electricity \& water framed context of decision with elicitation of subjects' household annual consumptions (KWh/m ${ }^{3}$ )
237 participants
13 sessions (LEEP, Paris 1) - 237 observations

Step 1: information collection
to evaluate the levels of
consumptions


+ Risk elicitation test (Eckel et al. 2012)
+ Rationality test
+ Final questionnaire (choice (qualitative) explanation...)


## Conjectures

1. Subjects prefer simplest tariff : Lineartariff < twopartariff < IncreasingBlocktariff
2. No good effect: same tariff choice no matter the good
3. When we incentivize, higher is the preference for the complex tariffs

## Data

Descriptive statistics about the main control variables :
$-N=237$
$-47 \%$ in Paris (53\% IDF)

- 32 \% women / 68 \% men
$-37 \%$ tenant / $63 \%$ property owner
$-13,08 \%$ in house (87 \% in appartment)


## Set of variables

## - Control variables:

Table 2 Summary statistics for the control variables

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Owner | 0.338 | 0.474 |
| House | 0.131 | 0.338 |
| Scoreratio | 0.671 | 1.109 |
| Paris | 0.473 | 0.5 |
| nPersons | 2.384 | 1.347 |
| Age | 47.245 | 15.205 |
| Gender | 0.321 | 0.468 |
| Income | 4642.308 | 5121.815 |

## Set of variables

- Set of variables about the un-incentivised choices :
- Score of the number of choices of a type of tariff for water and electricity

Table 3 Summary statistics for the variables of preferences (without incentives)

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| pref_progressive_elec | 0.219 | 0.415 |
| pref_two-part_elec | 0.232 | 0.423 |
| pref_linear_elec | 0.439 | 0.497 |
| pref_progressive_water | 0.219 | 0.415 |
| pref_two-part_water | 0.346 | 0.477 |
| pref_linear_water | 0.325 | 0.469 |
| indif_elec | 0.042 | 0.201 |
| indif_water | 0.063 | 0.244 |

## Set of variables

## - Set of variables about the incentivised choices

 :- Score of the number of choices of a type of tariff for water and electricity

Table 4 Summary statistics for the variables of preferences (with incentives)

| Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| pref_progressive_elec_p2 | 0.257 | 0.438 |
| pref_two-part_elec_p2 | 0.232 | 0.423 |
| pref_linear_elec_p2 | 0.422 | 0.495 |
| pref_progressive_water_p2 | 0.257 | 0.438 |
| pref_two-part_water_p2 | 0.346 | 0.477 |
| pref_linear_water_p2 | 0.3 | 0.459 |
| indif_elec_p2 | 0.055 | 0.228 |
| indif_water_p2 | 0.034 | 0.181 |

## Set of variables

- Difference between incentivised and unincentivised choices :


Fig. 3 Number of persons per household.

## Set of variables

## - Set of variables about the individual preferences to explain the different choices

| Question | Name of the <br> variable |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1. When choosing my prices, I have given priority to... |  |
| 1.1. ..the simplicity of the tariff | pref11 |
| 1.2. ...predictability of the invoice | pref12 |
| 1.3. ..the most financially advantageous. | pref13 |
| 2. On a daily basis, you seek to reduce your electricity <br> consumption. | pref2 |
| 3. On a daily basis, you want to reduce your water <br> consumption. | pref3 |
| 4. What is your motivation to reduce your electricity <br> consumption? |  |
| 4.1. Reduce your bill | pref41 |
| 4.2 Avoiding waste | pref42 |
| 4.3. Participating in the fight against global warming | pref43 |
| 4.4. Other... | pref44 |
| 5. What is your motivation for reducing your water <br> consumption? | pref5 |
| 5.1. Reduce your bill | pref51 |
| 5.2 Avoiding waste | pref52 |
| 5.3. Participating in the fight against drought | pref53 |
| 5.4. Other... | pref6 |
| 6. You are willing to accept a decrease in comfort or <br> a change of habit to reduce your water consumption. |  |
| 7. You are willing to accept a decrease in comfort or <br> a change of habit to reduce your electricity consump- <br> tion. | pref7 |
| 8. Your effort should result in savings on your bill. | pref8 |

Table 5 Questions explaining consumer choices and the names of the variables.

## Probit models

1. Model 1 : probit model to explain the main parameters of the un-incentivised choice
2. Model 2 : probit model to explain the incentivised choice (by including the answers from the part 1)

## Results

## - Without incentives :

- Good effect (electricity =/= water)
- Less rationality and strong preference for easiest tariffs
- The socio-demographic factors are more significant


## - With incentives:

- better understanding of the tariffs
- More rational choices to minize the bill
- Decreasing of the « good effect »
- ...but the easiest tariffs always are dominant


## Conclusion

- When we encourage the consumer, she improves her rationality
- Tariff design seems like a tool for changing behavior
- The effect diminishes when we help the decision (nudge effect?)
- But, this effect is partial !
- Morality : a "false good idea" ?


## Conclusion



Thanks for your attention!

