This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor. Accordingly, the results show that citizens find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences. At the same time, there is always an upper bound on the possible “extremism” of an editor above which the citizens' demand for news is strictly decreasing. Depending on the distribution of citizens' ideological preferences, a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in a monopolistic market. Moreover, ideological editors are more likely to be present in the market for news: i) the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for news; ii) the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information.
Additionality is a key requirement for the renewables based electricity to be used by electrolysers to produce renewable hydrogen. Additionality could be defined as the requirement that renewables-based electricity used [...]
China has always upheld multilateralism and has advocated the use of multilateral mechanisms to jointly address global climate change issues. This paper discusses what China does and why, and how [...]
Around 75% of European cargo transport operations in terms of ton-kilometers are performed by trucks, which, in turn, entail massive environmental and societal impacts. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, road [...]