

RAILWAY SECURITY: RESPONSIBILITY DISTRIBUTION WHO SHOULD REGULATE? HOW?

13th FLORENCE RAIL FORUM – 25 NOVEMBER
2016

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
01.
RAILWAYS ARE COMMITTED TO ENSURE THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF SECURITY
02.
MANY PLAYERS INVOLVED, MANY MEASURES IN THE EXISTING SECURITY FRAMEWORK
03.
WHAT ROOM FOR EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE?

01.

RAILWAYS ARE COMMITTED TO ENSURE
THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF
SECURITY

**« SECURITY IS NOT A COST.
IT IS AN INVESTMENT. »**

+ SNCF INVESTS IN A
DIVERSITY OF
COMPLEMENTARY
SECURITY TOOLS
AND MEASURES



+ SNCF HAS BEEN
REINFORCING ITS
RANGE OF TOOLS IN
THE PAST FEW
MONTHS

MAINTSTREAMING OF SECURITY MEASURES AMONG STAFF



(BASIC STEPS TO CARRY OUT
IN CASE OF AN ATTACK)


+ SNCF HAS BEEN
REINFORCING ITS
RANGE OF TOOLS IN
THE PAST FEW
MONTHS

TOOLS OF COLLECTIVE VIGILANCE FOR PASSENGERS/CITIZENS




+ SNCF HAS BEEN
REINFORCING ITS
RANGE OF TOOLS IN
THE PAST FEW
MONTHS

DOG PATROLS (EXPLOSIVE DETECTION)



+ SNCF HAS BEEN
REINFORCING ITS
RANGE OF TOOLS IN
THE PAST FEW
MONTHS

TARGETED USE OF TECHNOLOGIES



+ SNCF HAS BEEN
REINFORCING ITS
RANGE OF TOOLS IN
THE PAST FEW
MONTHS

NEW POWERS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY STAFF (SUGE)



(2016 PIECE OF LEGISLATION)

02.

MANY PLAYERS INVOLVED
MANY MEASURES IN THE EXISTING
SECURITY FRAMEWORK

CENTRAL
STATE

MILITARY

REPR. OF THE
STATE AT
DEPARTEMENT
LEVEL (PREFECT)

POLICE

GENDARMERIE

EMERGENCY
SERVICES

CONTRACTED
SECURITY
COMPANIES

SUGE




**+ ROLE OF THE STATE IS KEY TO ENSURE COORDINATED ACTIONS
OF THESE MEMBER STATE-SPECIFIC SERVICES WITHIN A COHERENT FRAMEWORK**

A FRENCH EXAMPLE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING: VIGIPIRATE

A THREAT-BASED CROSS-SECTOR PREVENTION PLAN ENCOMPASSING 300 MEASURES

From threat assessment to implementation on the ground

- + Terrorist threat assessment: intelligence services
- + Identification of sector vulnerabilities: ministries
- + Decentralised implementation: prefects (ensure coherence)



Source: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/site_rubrique98.html

A FRENCH EXAMPLE OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING: VIGIPIRATE

A THREAT-BASED CROSS-SECTOR PREVENTION PLAN ENCOMPASSING 300 MEASURES

+ Sector-specific objectives

+ Pre-established distribution of roles and responsibilities in each sector

On this basis, SNCF defines modalities of implementation

| Objectifs | Mesures | Acteurs concernés | Type de mesure |
|--|---|--|----------------|
| 2. Protéger les gares, notamment multimodales | Organiser des rondes et patrouilles dans les gares ferroviaires et routières, en ciblant plus particulièrement les gares multimodales | Forces de l'ordre Opérateurs ferroviaires | socle |
| | Mettre en œuvre un dispositif de vidéo-protection | Opérateurs ferroviaires | socle |
| | Faire appel aux armées pour des opérations de surveillance dans les zones publiques des gares ferroviaires et routières | Armées | socle |
| | Sécuriser les dépôts d'objets de toute nature et les poubelles | Opérateurs ferroviaires | socle |
| | Diffuser des messages d'information et des consignes particulières aux usagers | Opérateurs ferroviaires | additionnelle |
| | Restreindre, dérouter ou arrêter les trafics | Opérateurs ferroviaires | additionnelle |
| | Évacuer les pôles d'échange | Préfectures Opérateurs ferroviaires | additionnelle |

Source: public part of the Vigipirate contingency plan

A SECTOR-SPECIFIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN: METROPIRATE

LAUNCHED IN CASE OF AN IMMINENT THREAT OR IN CASE OF AN ATTACK

- + complements Vigipirate at the stage of an actual crisis
- + organises a scenario-based response when a crisis occurs in a particular environment (underground rail transport)
- + crisis management is steered by a Minister
- + Metropirate has equivalents in other sectors/environments (built along the same structure)



FROM A TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO A MORE INCLUSIVE DESIGN PROCESS



- + Contingency planning leads to a series of mandatory requirements imposed by national authorities on operators
- + However: evolution towards more dialogue with all relevant stakeholders to feed in the design of contingency plans
- + Distributions of tasks and consultation should aim at making the most of each player's specific know-how and knowledge of the sector environment

03.

WHAT ROOM FOR EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE?

NATIONAL STRUCTURES SHOULD BE RESPECTED

IT WOULD BE MORE EFFICIENT TO LEAVE THE DETAILS OF RESPONSIBILITY DISTRIBUTION UP TO THE MEMBER STATES

- + because there is a great variety among law enforcement set-ups in the different countries
- + because there is a great variety of tasks and powers of the internal railway security services

STREAMLINED CONTINGENCY PLANNING PRINCIPLES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES ACROSS THE DIFFERENT SECTORS

- + in order to have clear command lines that work along the same principles so as to create reflexes and facilitate quick responses

THE EU HAS A ROLE TO PLAY

- + Promoting exchange of good practices between Member States and between operators
- + The EU could play a role in promoting useful, well-grounded, and sound national measures → political pressure tools to incentivise national authorities to carry out solid impact assessments
- + Benchmark of national set-ups (e.g. for internal railway security forces)
- + The EU as a facilitator in the discussions between Member States to allow security forces from MS A to be present and active on the other side of the border in MS B

SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERVENTION PRINCIPLES

- +Result-oriented approach
- +Bearing in mind potential circumvention strategies and side effects such as shifting the risk onto other targets
- +Avoid measures that would have a cost (in terms of competitiveness or attractiveness of rail transport) while missing their target, i.e. while being inefficient
- +It would not be acceptable to differentiate the level of security between types of services, unless this is duly justified by the nature of the threat: we owe the same level of security to all our customers.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

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