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13TH FLORENCE RAIL FORUM SUMMARY

**"RAIL PASSENGER SECURITY: IS IT A CHALLENGE FOR THE
SINGLE EUROPEAN RAILWAY AREA?"**

A SUMMARY OF THE PRESENTATIONS

Florence, 25th November 2016

**Editors: Matthias Finger,
Nadia Bert, David Kupfer, Kathryn Bouchard**

Forum Summary Document

■ PROGRAMME

- 08.30 - 09.00 **Introduction to the Forum**
Matthias Finger | FSR-Transport, EUI and of Chair MIR, EPFL
Carlos Mestre Zamarreno | European Commission, DG MOVE, Unit Security
- 09.00 - 10.30 **What can be done to improve security?**
Frank Miram | Deutsche Bahn
Andrea Pepato and **Immacolata Lamberti** | Ansaldo STS
Round Table Discussion
- 10.30 - 10.45 Coffee break
- 10.45 - 12.45 **What can be done to adjust and improve the security level of infrastructure?**
Victor Vaugoin | ÖBB
Olof Kjellstrom | Jernhusen
Luigi Rucher | Thales Italia/UNIFE
Round Table Discussion
- 12.45 - 13.45 Lunch break
- 13.45 - 15.30 **What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness among passengers?**
Anne-Laure Le Merre | UITP
Maria Cristina Fiorentino | FS Italiane/COLPOFER
Marco Gariboldi | European Passengers Federation
Kenji Murasaki | East Japan Railway Company
Round table discussion
- 15.30 - 15.45 Coffee break
- 15.45 - 16.45 **How should responsibility be distributed? Who should regulate and how?**
Sarah Laouadi | SNCF
Round table discussion
- 16.45 - 17.00 **Conclusion**
Matthias Finger | FSR-Transport, EUI and Chair of MIR, EPFL
Carlo Mestre Zamarreno | European Commission, DG MOVE, Unit Security

The present document summarises the content of the presentations delivered during the [13th Florence Rail Forum](#), and the following paragraphs offer short summaries of each presentation, illustrating the main points made and matters treated. The thoughts and opinions reported do not necessarily reflect the views of the contributors, as they have been collected by the authors of this summary.

To open the presentations, go to florence-school.eu, choose “transport” from the top menu bar and select “Forums” among the “activities”. Clicking on the title of the Forum will take you to the relevant page. Alternatively, by clicking on a presentation’s icon you may activate an internet link taking you to the full presentation, when available. Presentations are hosted on the FSR website by permission of the authors.



Introduction to the 13th Florence Rail Forum

Prof Matthias Finger

Director of FSR-Transport and of the Chair of Management of Network Industries (MIR),
École Polytechnique Fédérale Lausanne
(EPFL)

Introducing the 13th Florence Rail Forum on Rail Passenger Security Prof Matthias Finger focused on the background questions posed to the various stakeholders at the Forum. Given recent terrorist attacks to rail transport in the European Union, Prof Finger gave a very summary of the security-related challenges covered in the European agenda on security 2015-2020. He asked how compatible are different Member States’ actions within the context of a Single European Rail Area. And more generally, is more freedom of movement contradictory to European security in general? Where does freedom end and security begin?

As usual at the Florence Rail Forums, discussions during the day follow four guiding questions, with the particularly interesting cross-modal reference to the air transport performance scheme.

The four questions for the day are:

- What can be done to improve rail passenger security?
- What can be done in matters of staff training and awareness rising among passengers?
- What can be done in matters of infrastructure?
- Who should be responsible for what?

Introduction to the 13th Florence Rail Forum

Carlos Mestre Zamarreno

Head of Unit "Security", European Commission, DG MOVE

In his opening statement Mr. Carlos Mestre presented the new "Security Unit" of DG MOVE, which covers all modes of transport. This organizational change, he explained, shows that security is a cross-cutting concern for the European Commission: the creation of a Unit within DG MOVE for all the transport modes is a concrete answer that proves the prominence of the issue of security of citizens who are travelling. The focus of discussion should be on how to ensure that the freedom of movement (in today's case via European rail) is not hindered by fears of inadequate security. In fact, transport has traditionally been an attractive target for attacks and, even if it is not the main target, it is always a preferred target because of the collateral damage that an attack to the transport system creates.

In this context, we must bear in mind that the different transport modes are at a different stage in terms of security legislation and their implementation. Compared to railways, other modes of transport (aviation, maritime) already have very mature international standards, but land transport has no European Union level competence. All rail transport regulation is managed at the national or even local level, and it is meant to be like this. However, a coordinated and common approach of Member States in relation to the protection of railway system is needed.

Mr. Mestre highlighted that there is an insufficient understanding of the threat to rail transport: different Member States have different methodologies for measuring threat, and different perspectives on what is perceived as a threat. He mentioned that in some cases a strictly local analysis of the threat does not consider the entire network, which is spread across national borders. Some measures that are effective at the local level might disrupt the network. As a corollary of this, there are also different approaches to the mitigation of risks in the different Member States, because of different perceptions, methodologies, and experiences. Therefore, the existing fragmentation is satisfactory neither from the security nor from the economic point of view. Mr. Mestre also went over the challenges posed to defining who is responsible for what, and posed the question, "who should decide what, where?"

Discussion in DG MOVE is primarily on how to protect the open, free space created in rail networks and stations without making rail travel, either passenger or freight rail, more difficult. The Commission can bring value to the discussion by standardizing indicators and language surrounding rail security, to facilitate implementation of security solutions across differing Member States regardless of measures already in place, cultural differences, etc. and especially without displacing the risk to other transport modes and without adding an unbearable burden on the actors in the field. In terms of methodology and replicability, Mr Mestre suggested the so-called risk-based approach already used in aviation which evaluates the threat, the impact, and the vulnerabilities, should be extended to the other modes of transport.

Given that absolute security is impossible, the discussion should be about striking a balance that provides the perception of security for passengers and potential threats. He noted that trading freedom for security inevitably leads to neither. The principles of proportionality and effectiveness should be preserved to achieve the best secure Single European Transport Area thanks to the participation of all the Member States.



Railway Security – DB's Perspective

Frank Miram

Director Economic, Political and Regulatory Affairs, Deutsche Bahn

Mr. Frank Miram from Deutsche Bahn spoke from a German transport operator's point of view. He highlighted the importance of the free movement of people in an open transport system. This is a fundamental difference to the aviation sector.

In Germany, the railway network is completely open, offering maximum flexibility to users. What makes this transport system special is that people can enter and leave the system at any time without controls of person or baggage. They can enter stations and use trains without being checked or registered. This flexibility of the system is what customers demand and what makes rail travel competitive compared to other modes of transportation in Germany. A failed experiment with closing the rail system with an approach like that of the aviation industry over 15 years ago confirms the fact that for rail travel to remain relevant it must remain open.

However, Mr. Miram went on to highlight that the openness of the system is a paradise for those wishing to cause harm to passengers. The threat to passengers is changing. In the past we saw cases such as Spain 2004, London 2005, Bonn 2006 (a failed attempt), which were highly organized in a 9/11 style, whereas now we see more radicalized individuals using easy to procure tools which means anyone may become a victim at any time in any place, including public transport. Threat levels remain high so it is clear that security must be addressed.

Mr. Miram then shifted his discussion to the practical responsibility of rail transport operators with a focus on the prevention of attacks. Cooperation should be a high priority, across national borders but also between rail operators and local and national security agencies. Raising passenger awareness can also be a useful tool to prevent not only attacks, but also the other various types of crime rail is facing every day (metal theft, vandalism, unsocial behaviour e.g.). He mentioned CCTV and the use of other innovative security technologies to monitor trains and stations to maximize the capabilities of security personnel.

Mr. Miram discussed the role of public transport authorities in funding rail transport security and in standardizing tenders so that security costs are built into rail transport budgets, and, of course, the sharing of security costs across borders through cooperation and exchange at the international level.

He concluded the discussion by reiterating the importance of improving security while maintaining the open rail transport system. Security authorities will also in future play a central role and the existing cooperation with the railways needs to be further expanded. A common approach at the EU- level is needed where a clear added value for the security of transport can be demonstrated to address today's security threats.



Cybersecurity in railway systems

Immacolata Lamberti, Manager
Transportation Systems Security, Ansaldo
STS & Andrea Pepato, Telecom & Security
Engineer, Ansaldo STS

At the 13th Florence Rail Forum, Ms. Immacolata Lamberti and Mr. Andrea Pepato represented Ansaldo STS, and they spoke about cyber security in a rail transport System context. Rail transport is considered a critical infrastructure (CI), for which cyber security activities focus on protecting information and minimizing risks related to data confidentiality, integrity and availability. Although CI represent the 3% of the entities exposed to Cybercrime, the cyberattacks is growing, up 154% from 2014-2015. Railway systems are particularly sensitive due to the nature of their construction. Ms. Lamberti went on to explain her Information Security Management System (ISMS) Process, established per the principle of the separation of duties and in accordance to ISO/IEC 27001 of 2013. She explained the four key phases of the Process which are governance, design, execution and control, all of which are aimed at successful prevention, detection and reaction to cyber-security attacks. Ms. Lamberti then introduced the “people, operation & maintenance, technology” model that is imperative to a successful cyber-security strategy. She highlighted that technological implementations are not enough to protect the CI, but rather maintenance and human precision are critical as well.

Following Ms. Lamberti, Mr. Pepato continued the discussion from a more technical point of view. He introduced the “defence in depth” concept, which is a concentric model that begins with policies and procedures, and goes inward toward physical security, a perimeter network defence, an internal network defence, host security, application security and finally data security. Mr. Lamberti then explained the various phases of cyber-security activities in general, which begin with governance, then focus on design. The design phase includes a threat analysis, and the various countermeasures available. The focus then shifts to the execution phase, when countermeasures are implemented, and then controlled continuously. Mr. Pepato then showed an example of how CI’s are divided: central site/peripheral sites, WAN & Wireless Infrastructure, Vital/Non-Vital connections, SCADA Systems, External Connections and Mobile/Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). Each CI section may be threatened at the level of integrity, confidentiality or availability. He mentioned that today a threat is the increased use of BYOD by both passengers and rail transport personnel.

After a brief overview of the new systems being used in train management today, Mr. Pepato concluded his discussion with a summary of the threats to CI including insiders, mistakes, sabotage, terrorists/activists, hackers and cyber criminals. He called for improved regulations and international standards, continuous technological improvement and increased collaboration among vendors, industries, institutions and governments.



Infrastructure & Security Measures- How ÖBB Strives for the Highest Standards

Victor Vaugin
Head of Brussels Office, ÖBB

Speaking as a representative of the Austrian national railway system, Mr. Victor Vaugin highlighted some of the infrastructure and security measures taken in Austria to address growing threats to rail transport. He immediately mentioned the refugee crisis in Austria, and security at train stations. He mentioned that railway infrastructure companies have an important role in customers' subjective sense of security, which in 2016 fell below ÖBB's target. Mr. Vaugin listed some of the present challenges to railway security in Austria, noting the marginalization of some segments of society, and increased intimidation of staff as particularly difficult. In the Austrian case the intimidation of staff is a problem due to the lack of a railway police body or equivalent, which is being discussed at the national legislative level.

Mr. Vaugin went over the Austrian national railway system's security goals, keeping in mind that they are a publicly funded entity and therefore must work to maintain public security within public policy constraints. He mentioned that they would like to engage mobile security teams to ensure short intervention times in the case of a security breach, which is feasible given Austria's relative small size. He then went on to describe some of the actions that ÖBB has taken to change their current situation and improve customer and staff sense of security. He mentioned the importance of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) when it comes to continued staff education and performance. He talked about how in Austria alcohol has been banned in train stations, a significant cultural change aimed at improving security.

Mr Vaugin described some of the working packages that ÖBB has employed, including the implementation of improved lighting in stations, improved video and surveillance measures, and improved presence and visibility of security mechanisms in stations. He then gave some specific examples of inexpensive measures aimed at improving the perception of security in railway stations. He mentioned the importance of uniforms, and the substitution of the term "Sicherheit" for "Security" as an improvement due to the actual perception of the word: the English word "Security" is perceived by ÖBB passengers as representing bouncers at clubs rather than important security figures. ÖBB uses psychology to improve the perception of security at a low cost. Other Working packages include Human Resource Development, Controls, the "Security at the Station" campaign aimed at informing passengers, and Market Research finding implementation.

Mr. Vaugin in closing quoted Abraham Lincoln: "If you trade security for freedom you will end up with neither."



Security within Infrastructure: Stations and Depots

Olof Kjellström

Corporate Strategy and Public Affairs,
Jernhusen

Mr. Olof Kjellstrom began with his introduction as a representative of Jernhusen, a state owned real estate company operating in the Swedish railway sector since 2001. He explained their mission as a commercial basis seeing higher transport volume, bringing more visitors to Jernhusen's stations, more freight through their intermodal terminals and more trains in their depots. He explained the role of the railway station as an open, public space linked to travel infrastructure, giving the passenger their first and last impression on their journey, and providing service facilities for extended periods of time. Mr. Kjellstrom then described the difficulty surrounding surveillance systems in stations due to the importance of personal integrity and public space. Mr. Kjellstrom described the many actors involved in a Swedish rail passenger's rail journey, beginning at their station of departure, then the platform managed by another actor, then the actual train which may be managed by a private or public operator, the platform at the station of arrival and finally the station of arrival, from which the passenger will exit. This complex system of actors therefore requires enhanced cooperation across all parties. Mr. Kjellstrom mentioned the challenge of dealing with parts of the system that are without security classification. He mentioned the difficulty in seeing deviations from the norm, especially in the case of outside contractors coming into the system for various reasons including maintenance.

Mr. Kjellstrom then shifted his discussion to more "soft" actions to be taken for rail security. Train stations attract various people which produce multiple challenges. He cited the example of someone in the station taking a nap on a station bench: at what point is it a security risk? He mentioned three Swedish initiatives focused on security which are "Hope in Stations" aimed at dealing with the problem of homelessness, "Train in Stations" aimed at training people to notice deviations in patterns, and "Work in Stations" aimed at getting people who have committed a crime in a station back in the station working on a project to take ownership of the station itself.

Mr. Kjellstrom summarized his take on how to improve infrastructure security. Infrastructure should have a security status as a highly protected object. He said that stations in Sweden are considered a place to shop, eat, meet friends, etc. and that it is important to maintain the open, public aspect of the station space. The industry must work with sustainability in stations by combining "hard" and "soft" aspects of security, and cooperation among actors and over country borders must continue.



How to adjust and improve the security level of infrastructure

Luigi Rucher, Technical Director,
ThalesGroup & Andrea Bastianelli,
ThalesGroup -- UNIFE

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Mr. Luigi Rucher introduced his organization, UNIFE, which works to represent the European Rail Supply Industry, and is a trusted international body representing over 1000 different rail related entities. He spoke about the role of digitalization of railways, and introduced UNIFE's digitalisation platform which has identified priorities in terms of security including better use of existing infrastructure, better access and use of data, enhanced security of the rail system through maintaining reliability/safety/operational continuity standards and improving passengers' experiences. Mr. Rucher talked about the two levels of cybersecurity threats and mentioned how the rail industry is using technology to detect anomalies in cyber behavior to prevent potential attacks, before introducing his colleague Mr. Bastianelli.

Mr. Andrea Bastianelli talked about how UNIFE brought many railway security entities together, following attacks in London in 2005, to improve rail transport security across Europe. He introduced the PROTECTRAIL initiative, an EU initiative to integrate the growing influx of security technologies into rail operations and make them interoperable to improve overall security. The project had a €22 million budget, €13 millions of which came from the European Commission, and lasted from September 2010 to October 2014. Following PROTECTRAIL was SECUR-ED with a similar scope on a larger scale.

Mr. Bastianelli described some demonstration operations that UNIFE carried out over the course of the two projects, with different objectives at different sites across Europe based on what local operators considered priorities. Mr. Bastianelli was sure to highlight that at the outset of each of the two projects roundtables were held to determine the priority of various threats at differing sites. He pointed out that what is perceived as a threat is very much subjective so each site demonstration was designed for the site itself. The projects developed increased overall capabilities due to the pooling of technical resources across borders and sectors. He concluded by stressing that through collaboration and cooperation, costs are reduced and security stakeholders understand each other.



What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness among passengers?

Anne-Laure Le Merre

Senior Advisor Regional and Suburban Rail,
UITP

At the 13th Florence Rail Forum, Ms. Anne Laure Le Merre represented UITP, the International Association of Public Transport. She began her presentation by highlighting the relative safety of rail transport compared to other methods of general transportation. She explained the mission to prevent, prepare for and respond to crime and fear of crime in a proportionate manner whilst maintaining an open and accessible system, which is essential for economic activity. She pointed out that the human factor is the most important variable when planning any rail transport security. The human factor crosses many levels, including front line staff, security staff, and external groups such as the police, other security authorities and of course passengers.

Since the human factor is so integral to rail transport security, the industry should do all it can to ensure adequate job profiles and training for its staff. Front line staff are the eyes and ears of the rail industry environment, and therefore should be utilized appropriately to identify anomalies as they carry out day to day tasks. Security awareness, including terrorism, the reporting culture and basic standard operating procedures should be clearly defined and communicated to all staff. Security staff should receive training adapted to their role, responsibility, and the identified threats keeping customer service in mind. Police, authorities and first responders should be trained about the rail environment, including chains of command, and general presence. Ms. Le Merre summarized some of the exercises that UITP uses for these training procedures before she went more in depth regarding passenger awareness campaigns.

Ms. Le Merre then described the possibility of insider threats and how recruitment and staff training can address that threat. Cooperation with authorities is important as they can help to identify points where radicalization is more likely, and provide intelligence on potential staff. She outlined UITP's work focus which is on counter terrorism awareness training for staff, basic security planning and crisis management planning, and the insider threat effort. She explained very thoroughly how staff training should be a critical piece of any rail security planning.



What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness among passengers?

Maria Cristina Fiorentino
COLPOFER Secretary General
FS Italiane – Security Department

Florence, November 25th 2016


What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness among passengers?

Maria Cristina Fiorentino

Security Department, Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane and Security General, COLPOFER

Ms. Maria Cristina Fiorentino spoke about what can be done to improve staff training and raise awareness of security threats among passengers. She gave an in-depth introduction to the *Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane* (FS) system, which hosts around 1,500,000 passengers daily. She described the threats to the system, which include not only just terrorism, but also graffiti, robbery, aggression, vandalism, material theft, arson, squatting, and even natural disasters. Ms. Fiorentino then described the physical measures that FS has implemented, such as CCTV in stations, on board trains, and the gates that have been erected in major train stations. FS has also established an emergency number for internal staff, and works in collaboration with of course the Italian railway police patrols. She also described some more organizational security measures, which included legal and psychological support for employees in case of aggression, an education program for staff regarding anti-aggression and self defence, anti fare-evasion teams on regional trains, emergency exercises and awareness campaigns.

Ms. Fiorentino described the collaboration between of the public and private rail transport sectors in Italy in the field of , and their focus on railway security measures. She described how CCTV can work on board, and serve as a deterrent to potential criminals. She also showed some of the ways FS is has implemented security measures with a specific emphasis on nominal ticketing systems. She described how varying systems can be integrated for maximum efficiency before describing the counter terrorism security training that FS is going to implement has implemented, focused on coping with terrorism, detecting abnormal behavior through body language analysis, crisis management in the event of terrorism attacks and the security of passengers and staff in the event of a terrorist attack. Ms. Fiorentino went in depth into anti-aggression training and security staff self-defence courses before describing the FS system's awareness campaign, aimed at educating passengers. To conclude, she described COLPOFER's various working groups working for international rail transport security. COLPOFER is the association of security managers and railway police forces of railways companies.



Rail Passengers' Security: the passengers view

Marco Gariboldi

Italian Delegate, European Passengers'
Federation

Mr. Marco Gariboldi began by introducing his organization, the European Passengers' Federation (EPF). The EPF is an independent body representing passengers' views on all transport at the European level. After the introduction, Mr. Gariboldi showed an image of an explosion inside an underground rail system in 1883 in London. The bomb was a terrorist attack by the IRA, which goes to show that terrorism in public transport systems is almost as old as public transport itself. Therefore, we are not dealing with something new per se, but rather an issue of proportionality. Proportionally, rail transport is extremely safe.

Mr. Gariboldi then presented the findings of a UK National Rail Passenger survey, a useful tool to see what are the true concerns of rail passengers. Questions regarding the fear of terrorism were added to the survey following the 7/7 London bombings, and the data shows that fear of terrorist attacks dissipated quite quickly following the attack. The report summary showed that most rail passengers feel safe, and the main concern of rail passengers are instead anti-social behaviours of other passengers, lack of staff and lack of police officers. Terrorism is not the highest fear. Passengers do not want to be inconvenienced by invasive security check points, and value the "turn up and go" flexibility of travel.

Mr. Gariboldi then went on to propose some solutions to addressing security in rail travel. He mentioned that any measures taken should not increase any overall security risk. He called for a proportionate response to terrorism, including scalability, matching resources to threats, and pooling intelligence. He mentioned the importance of visible and approachable staff, the full use of digital technology including CCTV, and passenger awareness. He then went into more detail on passengers' roles in security, including that passengers are willing to be vigilant but they must see staff to have someone to report what they notice to. He discussed some best practices for railway staff to maximise their effectiveness as a presence and interacting with passengers. He concluded his discussion with a mention of emerging technologies that might be effective including automatic tracking of individuals, "smart" CCTV that can pick up on anomalies in behaviour, and live CCTV streaming.



JR East Security Measures

What can be done to improve staff training and to raise awareness among passengers?

25 November 2016
13th Florence Rail Forum

Kenji MURASAKI
Deputy Director
Brussels Branch
EAST JAPAN RAILWAY COMPANY

JR East Security Measures

Kenji Murasaki

Deputy Head of Brussels Office, EJRC

Mr. Kenji Murasaki began his presentation with an introduction of the company he represents in Brussels, JR East. JR East is a private, integrated railway which also runs non-rail businesses including in-station commerce, and dealing with 17.3 million passengers daily. Mr. Murasaki then described JR East's security strategies, which address deterring threats, detecting threats and minimizing harmful consequences in the face of a threat.

JR East engages in security patrols, suspicious object analysis, and transparent waste containers for easy detection of potential threats. Mr. Murasaki also described how JR East engages passengers regarding security. In particular he mentioned the installation of "emergency stop buttons" on platforms so that passengers themselves can stop trains if necessary, and the operation of inspection vehicles before the first high speed train of the day. JR East uses approximately 24,500 CCTV security cameras in stations, on board trains etc. These cameras use image recognition technology in order to detect potential hazards.

Another aspect of JR East's security strategy is focused on staff training. Mr. Murasaki informed us that Following the Great East Japan earthquake, JR East interviewed railway staff for best practices in the case of a disaster or emergency. They determined that imagination, sensitivity to risk and effective decision-making were imperative for staff to react effectively. JR East then implemented an image training strategy based on brainstorming potential solutions to hypothetical problems for staff to practice reacting under pressure. Mr. Murasaki concluded his presentation by underlining the importance of the security discussion for his company as a sponsor of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. He described JR East's approach to the security question as holistic, including technological development, staff training, security patrols and coordination with other rail transport actors.

Railway Security. SBB Perspective

Luca Arnold

Head of Regulatory and International Affairs, SBB

At the 13th Florence Rail Forum, Mr. Luca Arnold provided some comments on the Swiss example of railway security strategy.

He explained that police competency in Switzerland lies traditionally at the subnational, canton level, so there are 26 local cantonal police authorities in Switzerland that deal with one national railway system. Train security has always therefore been seen as the responsibility of the rail operator, which led to the establishment of a railway police body. Since 2011 Swiss transport police (STP) has a legal national competency for railway security only. He explained how STP is perceived as real police, but they do not have public authority police competencies. They work instead closely with local police authorities for any security threat not directly on board a train related to railways.

Mr. Arnold mentioned that one less than ideal aspect of this particular solution is that STP is trained and uses resources like a local police force, but they do not have the same legal competencies, so their useful skill and training is not optimized. This also poses a challenge for personnel recruitment.

Mr. Arnold then stated the fundamental question: since there is no federal national police force, what should Switzerland do? Does Should more competency go be given to private national security forces such as the STP, or should a national public police force be created for railway security?

**RAILWAY SECURITY:
RESPONSIBILITY DISTRIBUTION
WHO SHOULD REGULATE? HOW?**

13th FLORENCE RAIL FORUM – 25 NOVEMBER
2016

SNCF REPRESENTATION PERMANENTE
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**Railway Security.
Responsibility Distribution:
Who should regulate? How?**

Sarah Laouadi

EU Affairs Advisor, SNCF

Ms. Sarah Laouadi spoke from the SNCF (*Société nationale des chemins de fer français*) perspective on railway security, the current railway security situation in France, and the possibility of room for European-level added value. She began by stating that SNCF and railways in general are committed to ensure the highest possible level of security, and in doing so they are investing in rail travel overall. SNCF has been reinforcing its range of security tools in the past few months, so Ms. Laouadi gave an overview of some of the measures they have taken. She mentioned the mainstreaming of security measures among staff, the introduction of tools of collective vigilance for passengers (a number that can be texted in case of an emergency), dog patrols, the targeted use of technologies like CCTV, and new powers for internal security staff (SUGE).

Ms. Laouadi proceeded to describe the French organizational structure, highlighting the importance of the role of the state when designing a security strategy due to the diverse governmental systems in each European Member State. She gave an example of how SNCF engages in contingency planning through a counter-terrorism State-driven scheme entitled Vigipirate which was a threat-based cross-sector prevention plan encompassing 300 security related measures. She then described a more sector-specific crisis management plan entitled Metropirate which was launched in case of an imminent terror threat or attack. The plan complements the Vigipirate plan by taking over when prevention is impossible. In the French model, other sectors have similar sector-specific plans. Ms. Laouadi discussed how contingency planning leads to a series of mandatory requirements on the railway sector that are imposed by national authorities on operators, which however are free to define the implementation modalities based on their knowledge of the specific environment. She also underlined welcome the fact that stakeholders' ideas on design and implementation of contingency plans are more and more taken into consideration in this field that used to be addressed in a top-down approach.

Ms. Laouadi's third point of discussion was the role the European Union might play in adding value to national security strategies regarding rail transport. She said that national structures should be respected as variety across member states is very high. However, the EU does have an important role to play through promoting the exchange of best practices among member states and operators and making sure all Member States enact the necessary frameworks and schemes (i.e. ensure there isn't any gap). She said that the EU may provide sound national measures and benchmarks, and could be useful in allowing for the transfer of national security forces across borders.

FSR-Transport: Contacts

Director: Prof. Matthias Finger

email: matthias.finger@epfl.ch

Coordinator: Nadia Bert

email: FSR.Transport@eui.eu

tel: +39.055.4685.795

address: Transport Area of the Florence
School of Regulation
European University Institute
Via Boccaccio 121
50133 Firenze – Italy

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