

20 Years of Rail Liberalisation in Europe: Key Lessons and Future Prospects


A View from CER

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Freight market entry: market share of non-incumbents, % t-km, selected MS (source: RMMS)



Acquisitions in European rail freight, selected cases 2005-2011 (Source: RMMS; media reports)



The Voice of European Railways

Company	Acquisitions
DB Schenker	RBH (DE); EWS (UK); Transfesa (ES); NordCargo (IT); PCC (PL); PTK Holding (PL)
SNCF	ITL (DE); Geodis (FR); Veolia Cargo (DE, IT, NL) (<-- Rail4Chem, DE)
Trenitalia	TX Logistik (DE)
Rail Cargo Austria	Linea (IT); MAV Cargo (HU)
Eurotunnel (Europorte)	Veolia Cargo (France); GB Railfreight (UK)
Jeroen Le Jeune (BE)	Crossrail AG (--> Babcock&Brown)
OKD Doprava (CZ)	Viamont Cargo (CZ)

- *Acquisitions*
 - DB Schenker far ahead
 - Other majors: SNCF, Trenitalia, Rail Cargo Austria, Eurotunnel (Europorte)
 - Overcome barriers - develop pan-European services
 - E.g. UK-Poland, Germany-Lithuania services (DB Schenker)

- *Alliance-building*
 - European Bulls: an alliance of new entrants (active 2005-2008)
 - X-Rail: market integration alliance of (mostly) dominant players

- *Domestic: competitive tendering (competition for the market)*
 - Entry of new private operators (e.g. Great Britain)
 - Entry through joint ventures, e.g. Govia (UK, 3 franchises), a joint venture of Keolis (35%) (majority SNCF-owned) and Go-Ahead (65%) (private)

- *Domestic: open-access (competition in the market)*
 - More challenging, e.g. compare % new entrants in Germany between long-distance passenger (open access) and regional (tendering)
 - E.g. Hamburg-Köln Express (HKX) (RDC + Locomore, with Veolia Transdev) still waiting for EBA's safety approval
 - In service: Regiojet CZ, Westbahn A

- *Cross-border (excluding high-speed)*
 - Joint ventures, e.g. Thello (Veolia Transdev + FS) for France-Italy services

- *Cross-border high-speed segment (examples)*
 - Thalys and Eurostar (both majority-owned by SNCF)
 - DB plans to offer London-Frankfurt and London-Amsterdam services

- *Domestic high-speed segment*
 - Southeastern (UK): regional high-speed services on HS1 since 2009
 - NTV (Italy, fully private) should start HS services in Italy in 2012

- *Many segments require a critical mass for successful entry*
 - Large historical operators acting alone or through joint ventures
 - Few new entrants can cope (so far) - joint ventures often the solution

- *Market (re-) consolidation in favour of large historical operators*
 - E.g. DB acquisition of Arriva
 - Except Arriva Deutschland (now Netinera) → to FS

- *Divestment and restructuring among new entrants*
 - E.g. Veolia Environnement to divest from Veolia Transdev
 - Veolia Transdev to re-concentrate its portfolio

- *Multi-modal operations / integration*
 - The major historical operators are already multi-modal (also in freight)
 - logistics & mobility providers, as opposed to just rail operators
 - Major private groups as well, e.g. Veolia Transdev, Keolis, Arriva
 - all provide rail, light rail, and bus services
 - Good potential for provision of full door-to-door mobility concepts

- *Question*
 - Competition separately between segments, to be integrated through partnerships and standardisation efforts, AND/OR
 - Competition between providers of integrated multi-modal services?



Draw on experience of freight liberalisation

for successful liberalisation, other economic conditions play a major role

- infrastructure funding
- infrastructure charging
- taxation
- handling of historic debt



Adapt to the specificities of the domestic passenger market

- PSOs, the biggest part, partly paid by the public authorities
- need to keep the consistency of services with multiple actors
- social dimension / social rules

Problem

Under-compensation of PSO services

- State-owned **historical operators** ordered to deliver PSOs at loss
 - Too weak to bid for other PSOs elsewhere
 - Too weak to launch new open-access services
- **New entrants** lose the bids as too costly, or stay away from the tender

Solution

Making sure that PSO contracts truly deliver by...

- **Ensuring that existing legislation is enforced:** public authorities must duly pay for the services they buy
- **Allowing for subsidiarity** with respect to the granting of exclusive rights: for some segments, this can ensure higher profitability and lower public funding

Problem

More actors, more interfaces, more coordination

- **More cost** (McNulty report)

Solution

„Network Schemes“ to ensure service consistency?

- Regulation, licensing, safety certification, PSO tendering...
- Harmonisation of timetables
- Complaint handling, settlement of compensations...
- Settlement of ticket revenues
- Information to customers
- Interfaces between information systems of different operators, etc...

**In light of the McNulty report,
Network Scheme evaluation is needed.**

Question

Who should pay?

- End-users (risk of lowering rail competitiveness)
- Public authorities (conflict with increasing public budget constraints)

- CER supports the opening of domestic passenger markets to competition
- Market opening has been a success in several Member States where it has encouraged better performance
- Re-concentration in favour of large historical operators is inevitable: rail is a capital-intensive business

However

- The real competition is **with the other modes**
- Framework conditions radically modify economic outcomes
- **The cake has not grown bigger everywhere: market opening is not enough**
- Infrastructure capacity and quality and relative prices drive modal choice
- Infrastructure financing, PSO compensation, and historical debt levels are good predictors of rail business performance

Thank you for your attention!



The Voice of European Railways

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